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I. STATEMENT OF fflE CASE.
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case arises from the district court's denial of Third Party Defendants'/Appellants',
Treasure Valley Area of Narcotics Anonymous' and Narcotics Anonymous Literature's (collectively
"TVNA") request for attorney's fees for its successful defense of claims for liability based on duties
arising under a commercial lease. The case was initiated when Plaintiff Donna Simono ("Simono")
made claims for personal injury resulting from her fall on the stairs of the Turner House, a
commercial building in Mountain Home, Idaho. At the time of Simona's fall, the Turner House
building was owned and managed by Defendants/Third Party-Plaintiffs/Respondents, Turner House,
Larry J. Rogers' and Cheryl Barker (collectively "Turner House"). R. Vol. I, pp. 33. TVNA were
tenants leasing space on the third floor of the Turner House. Id On March 5, 2013, Simono filed her
Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Turner House alleging that she fell on the
stairs of the Turner House due to inadequate lighting between the second and third floors. R. Vol. I,
pp. 19-23.
Turner House filed its Third Party Complaint against TVNA on November 4, 2013 alleging
that TVNA was liable for Plaintiff's injuries based on TVNA's failure to adequately maintain the
meeting room it leased on the third floor of the Turner House under the terms of the commercial lease
("Lease") between Turner House and TVNA. R. Vol. I, pp. 32-38. 1 Simona's claims for personal
injury and Turner House's claims for third party liability against TVNA were tried to a jury. The jury
trial resulted in a verdict in favor of TVNA on the express question of "[w]as there a breach of

1

Although the Rental Agreement/Lease was supposedly attached to the Third Party Complaint as
"Exhibit A" (R. Vol. 1, p. 8, ,I 8) it was inadvertently omitted by Turner House when it filed the
Third Party Complaint with the Court. A copy of the Rental Agreement/Lease can be found at R.
Vol. 1, pp. 108-109.
1

contract on the part of' TVNA "which was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages?" R. Vol. IV, p.
618. Despite prevailing on each of Turner House's claims for liability based on the Lease, the district
court denied TVNA's Motion for an award Attorney Fees from Turner House pursuant to Idaho Code
§12-120(3) in response to TVNA's initial Motion for Costs and Fees and subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. This appeal results from the district court's denial ofTVNA's attorney fees request
against Turner House under LC. § 12-120(3).

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
In their Third Party Complaint, Turner House alleged that TVNA was liable for Simona's

injuries on the basis of four substantive causes of action: 1) Breach of Contract; 2) Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 3) Indemnification; and 4) Negligence. R. Vol. I,
pp. 35-37. Each of Turner House's claims for Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Indemnification were expressly based on duties allegedly arising
from the terms of the Lease. Id, pp. 35-36. Turner House's cause of action for Negligence was based
on a duty to exercise ordinary care in "maintaining the rental property leased from the Third Party
Plaintiffs." Id., p. 36. In its Third Party Complaint, Turner House also made a claim for attorney's
fees against TVNA based, in part, on LC.§ 12-120. Id, p. 37. TVNA's Answer and Demand for Jury
Trial denying that Turner House was entitled to recovery on any of its claims was filed on December
9, 2013. R. Vol. I, pp. 42-48.
After the discovery process was completed, Simona's and Turner House's claims were tried
to a jury between December 5 and 10, 2014. TVNA successfully defended Simono's underlying
allegations and each of Turner House's claims at trial. R. Vol. IV, pp. 617-619. On December 16,
2014, the district court lodged its Final Judgment. R. Vol. IV, p. 620-621. In its Final Judgment, the

2

district court acknowledged that all of Turner House's claims against TVNA had been tried and
dismissed. Id. Turner House's claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing against TVNA was dismissed with prejudice by the district court at the conclusion of
evidence. Id., p. 2. Turner House's claims for Breach of Contract, Indemnification and Negligence
were each dismissed with prejudice as the result of the jury verdict. Id
In response to the jury verdict and the district court's Final Judgment, TVNA filed its Motion
for Costs and Fees and supporting Memorandum on December 30, 2014 requesting an award of
attorney fees for its defense of Turner House's claims under LC.§ 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)
54(d)(l). R. Vol. IV, pp. 630-674. Turner House filed its Objection to TVNA's Motion for Costs and
Fees on January 12, 2015. R. Vol. IV, pp. 678-687. On January 27, 2015, the district court issued its
Order Granting TVNA's Motion for Costs in Part but Denying Fees ("January 27, 2015 Order"). R.
Vol. IV, pp. 688-695. In its January 27, 2015 Order, the district court found that TVNA was the
prevailing party on the basis of the final judgment and acknowledged that TVNA obtained a
judgment with regard to all claims made by Turner House, but denied TVNA' s request for attorney
fees. Id, p. 690-695. Based on this Order, the district court entered its Second Amended Final
Judgment on January 27, 2015. R. Vol. IV, pp. 697-699.
TVNA filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's January 27, 2015 Order
and to Alter or Amend the Second Amended Final Judgment on February 9, 2015 and supporting
Memorandum on February 10, 2015. R. Vol. IV, pp. 700-711. In response, Turner House again
objected to TVNA's request for attorney fees. R. Vol. IV, pp. 712-719. After TVNA filed its reply
on March 4, 2015 (R. Vol. IV, pp. 720-726), the district court lodged its Order denying
Reconsideration of Third-Party Defendant's Fees ("March 9, 2015 Order") on March 9, 2015. R.
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Vol. N, pp. 727-738. TVNA filed its Notice of Appeal on April 20, 2015. R. Vol. IV, pp. 739-743.

C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
On the night of January 7, 2013, Simona attended a Narcotics Anonymous meeting held in

the third floor room of the Turner House that TVNA leased from Turner House. The O\vner of the
Turner House building, Defendant Larry Rogers, was in the process of remodeling the Turner
House at that time. In addition to completing work on retail space on the first floor of the Turner
House, Rogers was in the process of completing an apartment for his use on the second floor.
Although there was a lighting fixture on the second floor, it had not yet been wired for electricity,
and was, therefore, in-operational. When she left the meeting room on the third floor, Sirnono
traversed the third floor landing and began descending the stairs leading to the second floor. At the
bottom of the stairs between the third and second floors, Simona fell and seriously injured both of
her ankles.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying TVNA's Motion for Attorney Fees
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) in its Order Granting Third Party Defendant's Motion for
Costs in Part but Denying Fees.

B. Whether Appellant TVNA is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal
Pursuant to LC 12-120(3) and this Courts' Authority to Grant Appellate Attorney
Fees under LR.A 35 (a)(5), (b)(5) and 41.

III.

ARGUMENT

A The District Court Erred in Denying TVNA's Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to
I.C. § 12-120(3) in its Order Granting Third Party Defendant's Motion for Costs in
Part but Denying Fees.
I.C. § 12-120(3) requires an award of attorney fees arising out of any "civil action to
recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty or contract
4

relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial
transaction. In order for attorney fees to be awarded under the commercial transaction provision of
I.C. § 12-120(3), 1) "there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim", and 2)
"the commercial transaction must be the basis on which recovery is sought." Great Plains

Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001)
(quoting Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 744, 750; C&G Inc., v. Rule, 135
Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117
Idaho 780, 784, 793 P.2d 345,349 (1990)).
In its January 27, 2015 Order, the district court determined that:
This is not an issue of a duty to defend or indemnification. The court is not aware
that the Third Party Plaintiff ever made a request of the Third Party Defendant to
defend the negligence claim under the terms of the rental agreement. Additionally,
the Third Party Plaintiff was not determined to be negligent, by the jury therefore,
there was no request for indemnification for any damages. The crux of the Third
Party Complaint and the claims litigated at trial was that it was the Third Party
Defendant's negligence, if any, that caused the injuries to Ms. Simono. The rental
agreement was not integral to the claim of negligence by Mrs. Simono. The main
thrust of this lawsuit was clearly in tort. Therefore, attorney fees to the Third Party
Defendant are not available for defending this claim.
R. Vol. IV, p. 694.
In its January 27, 2015 Order, the district court supported its decision to deny TVNA's
Motion for Costs and Fees requesting an award of attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3) on the
basis that the case before the court "mirrors J.R. Simplot v. Rycair, Inc., 138 Idaho 557, 565, 67
P.3d 36, 44 (2003). R. Vol. N. p. 694. In J.R. Simplot v. Rycair, Plaintiff Simplot and Defendant
Rycair entered into a commercial lease whereby Rycair leased premises on Irving Street in Boise,
known as the Kaiser building. The lease was executed on September 1, 1995 and the building was
destroyed by fire approximately 16 months later. Id. at 38, 67 P.3d at 559. Simplot then filed suit to
5

recover its losses related to the destruction of the building and alleged claims both for breach of
contract and negligence. Id. In response, Rycair filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
the breach of contract claims, requesting that the district court find that Rycair was not required to
purchase and keep in force first-party fire insurance on the building and that it was not required to
indemnify Simplot for the property damage without proof of Rycair's negligence. Id. The district
court granted Rycair's motion and dismissed Simplot's breach of contract claims against Rycair.

Id.
After Simplot filed an amended complaint restating its breach of contract claims as well as
adding other breach of contract theories, Rycair filed a second motion for partial summary
judgment with regard to the new breach of contract theories. Id. The district court again granted
Rycair's motion dismissing Simplot's breach of contract claims prior to trial. Id. At the
conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a verdict that Rycair was not negligent and the district court
awarded Rycair attorney fees and costs as a matter of right. Id. In awarding attorney fees to
Rycair on both the contract claims which had been dismissed on summary judgment and on the
negligence claim that was tried, the district court found that:
[T]he lease the parties entered into was for commercial use and therefore constituted
a "commercial transaction" for purposes of LC. § 12-120(3). The district court
further determined that Simplot's "continuous references to the contract and
attempts to inject contract claims or issues into the negligence claim ... shows that
the commercial transaction was the basis upon which Simplot attempted to recover.
Id. at 565, 67 P.3d at 44.

Simplot then appealed the district court's grant of Rycair's motions for partial summary
judgment and the award of attorney fees. On appeal, Simplot contended that the district court erred
in awarding the portion of attorney fees to Rycair related to the negligence claim. Id. at 565, 67
P.3d at 44. In response, Rycair asserted that all of Simplot's allegations and action in the case were

6

based upon the lease and thus the defense presented by Rycair was based entirely upon the lease.
Id. Rycair asserted, therefore, that it was proper for the district court to award attorney fees

pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3). Id.
In reaching its decision in J.R. Simplot v. Rycair, this Court held that:
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for the recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing
party in a civil action to recover on any commercial transaction. The term
"commercial transaction," as defined by LC.§ 12-120(3), includes all transactions
except transactions for personal or household purposes. This Court has previously
held that " '[a]ttorney fees are not appropriate under LC. § 12-120(3) unless the
commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon
which the party is attempting to recover.'" C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769,
25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (quoting Brower v. E.1 DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117
Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,349 (1990)).
Id. at 564, 67 P.3d at 43.

This Court in JR. Simplot v. Rycair then held that LC. § 12-120(3) provided for the award
of attorney fees to Rycair as the prevailing party based on its defense of Simplot's claims for
breach of contract based on the commercial lease. Specifically, this Court held that:
The commercial lease is integral to the contract claims and served as one of the
theories upon which Simplot sought to recover. Attorney fees could be properly
awarded by the district court under the lease and LC. § 12-120(3) for claims relating
to the lease. However, the lease and LC.§ 12-120(3) do not provide for fees on the
claims relating to the negligence cause of action. Therefore, Rycair should not be
awarded attorney fees for defending at trial the tort claim concerning negligence.
Id. at 565, 67 P.3d at 44.

This Court in J.R. Simplot v. Rycair then set aside the district court's award of attorney fees
on the basis of both the contract and negligence claims. This Court remanded the case to the
district court to allocate the attorney fees incurred by Rycair in defending against the breach of
contract claims dismissed on summary judgment but not to include fees incurred in defending the
negligence cause of action. Id.
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In its March 9, 2015 Order, the district court found that Turner House's claims against
TVNA were governed by I.R.C.P. 14:
[The Third-Party Claim] cannot simply be an independent or related claim but must
be based upon Plaintiffs claim against Defendant. The crucial characteristic of a
rule 14 claim is that Defendant is attempting to transfer to the Third-Party
Defendant the liability asserted against him by the original Plaintiff. No fact of the
alleged Third-Party Claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as the
original claim is not enough.
R. Vol. IV., p. 735.
The district court then found that, "the only valid contract claims against Third-Party
Defendant were those which were based on indemnification." R. Vol. IV., p. 735. The district
court then restated its earlier finding from its January 27, 2015 Order in stating: "[t]hird-Party
Plaintiffs essentially withdrew any contract claims at trial, leaving the sole issue for determination
that of indemnification." Id. The district court found in its March 9, 2015 Order that:
At its heart, this case was about negligence, and Third-Party Defendant was as
interested in showing its non-negligence as were Third-Party Plaintiffs/Defendants.
The issues of contractual indemnification or the contract were in the background,
and were never, "the substantial point or essence of the claim, grievance, or
complaint." GRAVAMEN, Black Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014).
R. Vol. IV., p. 736.
As noted above, this Court found an award of attorney's fees to Rycair in the JR. Simplot
v. Rycair case proper under LC. 12-120(3) where Simplot had made "continuous references to the
contract" and attempted "to inject contract claims or issues into the negligence claim .... " showing
"that the commercial transaction was the basis upon which Simplot attempted to recover." Id at
565, 67 P.3d at 44. While the holding in JR. Simplot v. Rycair establishes that TVNA was entitled
to an award of attorney fees for its defense of Turner House's claims based on the Lease even had
the claims been dismissed prior to trial, the record clearly shows that Turner House did not
8

"essentially" withdraw its "contract claims at trial." This finding by the district court was error. As
in J.R. Simplot v. Rycair, Turner House made continuous references to the Lease in support of its
contract claims and also injected contract claims and issues into the negligence claim throughout
trial. The Lease served as the basis for Turner House's claims against TVNA from opening
statement through the final jury verdict. In its opening, Turner House told the jurors that Ms.
Rogers would testify that the Lease was in place at the time of Simona's injuries. Tr. Vol. I, p. 41,
LL. 13-18. Specifically, Turner House asserted during its opening statement that, "[a]s part of the
terms of that lease, Narcotics Anonymous was responsible for the upkeep of the maintenance of
the stairs from the bottom to the third floor, because they were the only ones using it on a daily
basis." Id, LL. 19-23. During Ms. Rogers's initial testimony in Simono's case in chief, Ms.
Rogers identified the Lease and it was admitted into evidence as Turner House's Exhibit B. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 153, L. 3-p. 158, L. 14. Turner House then elicited testimony from Ms. Rogers
attempting to support its claims against TVNA not only with the written terms of the Lease, but
also with additional terms under what Ms. Rogers claimed was a "verbal lease." Tr. Vol. I, p. 158,
L. 20-p. 166, L. 6.
Mr. Rogers, the owner of the Turner House, also testified during Simono' s case in chief
and provided testimony not only about the terms of the written lease, but also about additional
alleged verbal lease agreements for the maintenance of the stairwell. Tr. Vol. III, p. 92, L. 24-p. 95,
L. 4. In response, TVNA was required to cross-examine Mr. Rogers to elicit his testimony that
there was nothing in the wTitten terms of the Lease that would have required T\TNA to maintain the

stairwell and that the Lease required additional terms be in writing. Tr. Vol. III, p. 102, L. 15-p.
107, L. 18.
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During the interim jury instruction conference on December 10, 2014, Turner House then
indicated that it was still pursuing its claim for Indemnification based on the Lease but that
Indemnification was a question of law for the court to determine after the jury reached its verdict.
Tr. Vol. II, p. 252, L. 19-p. 254, L. 23. In addition, the district court then stated that jury
instructions on Turner House's Breach of Contract Claim and the issue of good faith and the
covenant of fair dealing would still be required before the case could be submitted to the jurors. Id.,
p. 253, L. 24-p. 254, L. 9.
Subsequently, TVNA moved for a directed verdict dismissal of Turner House's claims
based on lack of evidence. Tr. Vol. III, p. 321, L. 19-p. 326, L. 17. In response, the district court
denied TVNA's motion on the Breach of Contract Claim but granted its Motion dismissing Turner
House's claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the
Lease. Tr. Vol. III, p. 326, L. 18-p. 332, L. 5. During the next jury instruction conference, the
district court granted Turner House's request for a jury instruction related to a burden of proof on
breach of contract under the terms of the Lease against TVNA. Tr. Vol. III, p. 373, LL. 9-23. This
determination resulted in the district court charging the jury with "Question No. 4" which asked
the jurors to determine was there a breach of contract on the part of TVNA which was a proximate
cause of Plaintiffs damages? Tr. Vol. III, p. 430, L. 22-p. 431, L. 5; R. Vol. IV, p. 618. After
deliberations, the jury found that there was no breach of the Lease by TVNA that was a proximate
cause of Plaintiff's damages. R. Vol. IV, p. 618.
Tne JR. Simplot v. Rycair case involved similar legal issues regarding an award of
attorney's fees in case involving both claims for breach of contract based on a commercial lease
and a separate claim for negligence. JR. Simplot v. Rycair, therefore, supported TVNA's request
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for attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(3) in an apportioned amount based on its defense of Turner
House's claims for Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing and Indemnification. Where more than one claim is pled, there can be more than one
gravamen, and attorney fees can still be awarded for a specific claim, if the claim is the type
covered by LC. § 12-120(3). Great Plains Equipment, Inc. at 472, 36 P.3d at 224. TVNA
prevailed at trial on each of Turner House's claims, obtaining dismissal with prejudice on each of
these claims in the Second Amended Final Judgment.
The Lease clearly constituted a commercial transaction under LC. § 12-120(3) which
defines commercial transactions as including all transactions except transactions for personal or
household purposes. As the Third Party Complaint alleged, Turner House's causes of action for
Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing were
entirely based on the terms and provisions of the Lease. R. Vol. IV., p. 35. Not only was TVNA
forced to defend itself through trial based on alleged duties arising from the written terms of the
Lease, Turner House alleged at trial that the Lease had been amended by additional verbal terms
creating additional duties. Throughout trial, Turner House attempted to introduce parol evidence to
support its claim that subsequent verbal agreements not found in the written terms of the Lease had
created additional contractual duties that were breached by TVNA. Tr. Vol. I, p. 160, L. 16-p. 166,
L. 6.
Turner House's cause of action for Indemnification was based on both the written terms of the
Lease and/or the comn1on law of indemnification arising from the commercial transaction between
the parties. Id., p. 36. The basis for each of Turner House's contract claims was the terms and
provisions of the Lease and the Lease clearly constituted the basis upon which Turner House
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attempted to recover against TVNA. While TVNA was also forced to defend itself at trial against
Simono's underlying negligence claim due to the Third Party Complaint, the Lease was integral to
Turner House's third party contract claims and constituted the basis for Turner House's attempt to
recover against TVNA. TVNA should have been awarded its attorney fees for the defense of each of
Turner House's Contract claims under LC. § 12-120(3).
In addition, Turner House's cause of action for negligence was based on the existence of a
commercial transaction between the parties. As alleged by Turner House, TVNA had a duty to
exercise ordinary care in "maintaining the rental property leased from the Third Party Plaintiffs." Tr.
Vol. I, p. 36. While the Simono's claim for negligence against Turner House was based on common
law theories of premises liability, Turner House's claim for negligence against TVNA was entirely
based on the alleged duties ofTVNA arising from the Lease and purported oral amendments. In the
absence of any alleged duty to maintain the premises in the Lease, Turner House would have had no
support for the duty and breach elements ofits claim for negligence against TVNA. As noted above,
"[A]ttorney fees can still be awarded for a specific claim if the claim is of the type covered by LC.
§ 12-120(3) even when the claim is covered by other theories that would not trigger application of
the statute. Great Plains Equipment, Inc. at 472, 36 P.3d at 224. In this case, the Lease was the
sole basis for the duty and breach elements of Turner House's negligence claim against TVNA
and constituted at least part of the basis for its effort to recover against TVNA on this claim.
TVNA should also have been awarded its attorneys fees under LC. § 12-120(3), in whole or in part,
for the defense of Turner House's negligence cla:itu because the Lease was integral to the creation of
TVNA's alleged duty and constituted the basis on which Turner House sought recovery against
TVNA for its alleged breach.

12

B. Appellant TVNA is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal
Pursuant to LC 12-120(3) and this Courts' Authority to Grant Appellate Attorney
Fees under LR.A 35 (a)(5), (b )(5) and 41.
Pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) and this Courts' authority to grant Appellate costs and attorney
fees under LR.A 35 (a)(5), (b)(5), 40 and 41, TVNA requests an award of its costs and reasonable
attorney fees on Appeal. If this Court determines that TVNA was entitled to an award of its attorney's
fees in the district court action pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) and determines that TVNA is the
prevailing party here on Appeal, LC. § 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney fees on appeal as
well as in the trial court. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 438 64 P.3d 959, 966 (Ct. App. 2002)
(citing JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics lnt'l, Inc., 130 Idaho 255,258, 939 P.2d 574,577 (1997).

IV.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3) and LR.A 35 (a)(5), (b)(5), 40 and 41, TVNA requests an award
of its costs and reasonable attorney fees on Appeal.

V.

CONCLUSION

The only reasons that TVNA was forcibly introduced into the lawsuit as Third Party
Defendants were the four claims articulated in Turner House's Third Party Complaint. All of Turner
House's claims against TVNA centered upon the Lease and alleged verbal amendments of the Lease.
But for the Lease, TVNA would not have been involved in the instant litigation and was entitled to an
award ofits attorney fees for its defense of Turner House's claims under L C. 12-120(3).
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Respectfully submitted this

2i

~\

day of December 2015.

SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
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